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Abstract
Probability is usually closely related to Boolean structures, i.e., Boolean algebras or propositional
logic. Here we show, how probability can be combined with non-Boolean structures, and in particular
non-Boolean logics. The basic idea is to describe uncertainty by (Boolean) assumptions, which may
or may not be valid. The uncertain information depends then on these uncertain assumptions, sce-
narios or interpretations. We propose to describe information in information systems, as introduced
by Scott into domain theory. This captures a wide range of systems of practical importance such as
many propositional logics, first order logic, systems of linear equations, inequalities, etc. It covers
thus both symbolic as well as numerical systems. Assumption-based reasoning allows then to deduce
supporting arguments for hypotheses. A probability structure imposed on the assumptions permits
to quantify the reliability of these supporting arguments and thus to introduce degrees of support for
hypotheses. Information systems and related information algebras are formally introduced and stud-
ied in this paper as the basic structures for assumption-based reasoning. The probability structure is
then formally represented by random variables with values in information algebras. Since these are
in general non-Boolean structures some care must be exercised in order to introduce these random
variables. It is shown that this theory leads to an extension of Dempster–Shafer theory of evidence
and that information algebras provide in fact a natural frame for this theory.
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1. IntroductionArgumentation has gained growing recognition as a new and promising research direc-
tion in reasoning, and in particular, reasoning under uncertainty. Different authors have
investigated argumentation and its application in various domains. By looking at today’s
literature on this subject, one realizes that argumentation is understood in fairly different
ways. The variety of attempts to study the nature of arguments and the process of argu-
mentation is therefore characterized by a broad diversity.
It is not possible to give here a comprehensive account of what argumentation means in
its different interpretations, nor is it possible to list all relevant references to this subject.
Therefore only some work which has some connections to the approach presented here can
be mentioned. Many authors focus on the problem of the acceptability and the comparison
of arguments, e.g., [1,8]. A recent contribution in this area is the logic-based theory of
deductive arguments [4]. Some authors consider argumentation as a dialectical process
during disputations [28]. Other authors speak about negotiation [21]. We refer to [22] for
a fairly recent and comprehensive overview of modeling of argumentation. The common
feature of all these papers is their restriction to purely logical analysis. It is characteristic
of this work that it attempts to avoid the use of probabilities to compare or select relevant
arguments. This is in contrast to the approach presented in this paper, where it is proposed
to combine probability with logic in a new way.
The basic idea of the probabilistic argumentation systems framework goes back to the
concept of assumption-based truth maintenance systems (ATMS) [6]. The goal is not to
describe argumentation as a dialectic process, but rather to serve as a deductive tool that
helps to judge hypotheses, i.e., open questions about the unknown state of a past, present
or future world. This will be done using the available uncertain, partial and possibly even
contradictory knowledge and information. From a qualitative point of view, the problem is
to derive arguments in favor of hypotheses of interest. An argument is a defeasible proof
built on certain assumptions, i.e., a deduction of a hypothesis based on assumptions. For
this, the knowledge and the information must be represented in the language of an appro-
priate logic which provides the necessary deduction machinery. This can be propositional
or first order logic. It can also be some more restricted system such as systems of linear
equations or inequalities.
Although a qualitative judgment of a hypothesis, based on arguments, may be valuable,
a quantitative measurement of the degree of credibility or support of the hypothesis may
be more useful and help to decide whether a hypothesis can be believed in or not. For this
purpose a probabilistic structure can be defined on top of argumentation systems. It will
permit to compute the reliability of arguments and thus to measure the degree of support
of hypotheses.
This is the sketch of a novel way to combine logic and probability, the two classic
tools of inference. Logic serves to deduce arguments, probability to weigh them by their
reliability. We shall use classical, monotonic logic. Basically first order logic would be
an appropriate choice. However, this system is, especially for computations, often too
complex. Therefore, we shall use another abstract framework, information systems, for
our presentation. This will cover all practical systems such as propositional logic, fi-
nite constraint systems, systems of linear equations, and many others, for which efficient
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algorithms to construct arguments exist. Information systems and their use to define argu-
mentation systems will be described in Section 2. In this section we shall also introduce
the basic concepts of argumentation systems as understood in this paper.
Abstract argumentation systems induce in a natural way an interesting algebraic struc-
ture of assumption-based reasoning. In Section 3 this algebraic background of the theory
will be developed. It will be shown how information systems give rise to information al-
gebras. These algebras permit to describe the combination of pieces of information, and
also to define a partial order of information content. We use here a simplified version of
an algebra introduced in [13]. This will be sufficient for our purpose. Uncertainty is rep-
resented by a mapping from assumptions into an information algebra. This setting permits
to define a probabilistic structure on top of it in a natural way. The argumentation system
induces then a random variable with values in the associated information algebra. Since
these algebras are non-Boolean some care must be taken in defining random variables. The
approach proposed here constitutes one of the major new contributions of this paper. This
probabilistic structure will be examined in Section 4. It will be shown that it corresponds
to Dempster–Shafer theory [7,25] in an abstract setting.
The way we propose to combine logic and probability in this paper has already been
proposed in [17] in the particular context of propositional logic. It has been worked out
in this context to some extent in [9,14]. Especially the computational problems have been
examined in some depth and a software system for propositional probabilistic argumenta-
tion ABEL has been developed [2]. On the other hand [19] adopted the generic approach
described in this paper for the kind of numerical systems found in statistical inference, es-
pecially for linear systems with Gaussian disturbances. Information algebras in a somewhat
richer version have been introduced in [13]. Random variables in information algebras have
also been introduced in [13]. But the theory presented here is more complete and contains
new results.
2. Abstract argumentation systems
In order to specify information, we need an appropriate language, together with a means
to deduce consequences of the information. Therefore, we assume a languageL, which, for
our purposes, can be considered simply as a set of tokens or sentences. We do not need to
worry about the syntactical structure of sentences at this point. Information, i.e., data and
facts are then simply given as subsets X of L. The idea that certain other sentences can be
deduced fromX is represented by an entailment relation defined between subsets of X⊆ L
and single sentences s ∈ L. The notation X  s says that the sentence s is entailed by the
set of sentences X, or X entails s. This relation must satisfy the following conditions:
(E1) X  s for all s ∈X,
(E2) X  b for all b ∈ Y and Y  a imply X  a.
These are the usual conditions required for an entailment relation. The system (L,) is
called an information system. The notion of an information system has been introduced
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by [23], but we use it here in a slightly different way; in particular, we do not single out
finite consistent sets of tokens.
We sketch here a few nontrivial examples of information systems.
(1) Systems of linear equations. Consider a finite set of variablesX1, . . . ,Xn and a fieldF .
Let L be the set of linear equations of the form
a0 + a1X1 + · · · + anXn = 0,
with coefficients ai ∈ F . The entailment relation is defined using linear combination:
Let X ⊆ L, l ∈ L, then X  l, if there is finite subset Y = {l1, . . . , lm} ⊆X such that
l = λ1l1 + · · · + λmlm,
with λj ∈ F . We remark, that a similar system can be defined for linear inequalities
over ordered fields, where entailment is defined by positive linear combination.
(2) Propositional logic. Propositional logic is an information system. In fact, it is an ex-
ample of the following more general system.
(3) Contexts. A context is given by two sets M (whose elements are called models) and
S (whose elements are called sentences) and a relation |=⊆M × S. We write m |= s
(m models s) for (m, s) ∈|=. We define for any subset B ⊆ S the extend of B
rˆ(B)= {m ∈M: m |= s for all s ∈ B}.
Next, we say the relation B  s holds, if rˆ(B) ⊆ rˆ({s}). It is easy to verify that 
is an entailment relation. So, (S,) is an information system related to the context
(M,S,). This covers many logical systems: The elements of M are the structures of
a logical language S, which serve to evaluate sentences of S to true or false. Contexts
or Chu-spaces are discussed in [3,5]. We refer to [18] for a discussion of a similar
structure in a similar spirit as here, and also for several examples of logics falling into
this framework.
If (L,) is an information system, we introduce the operator
C(X)= {s ∈L: X  s}.
C is a mapping C :P(L)→ P(L). It is well known, and easy to verify that C has the
following properties:
(1) X ⊆ C(X) for all X ⊆ L.
(2) C(C(X))= C(X) for all X ⊆ L.
(3) Y ⊆X ⊆ L implies C(Y )⊆ C(X).
Thus, C is a consequence operator (or also closure operator). C(X) is called the closure
of X. A set X such that X = C(X) is called closed. And we say that Y is a consequence
of X, written as X  Y , if Y ⊆ C(X). Two sets X and Y are called equivalent, if C(X)=
C(Y ).
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Uncertainty is introduced into an information system by noting that an information may
depend on uncertain assumptions, on uncertain scenarios or may have an uncertain inter-
pretation. This is captured by a set Ω whose elements ω represent possible assumptions,
scenarios or interpretations on which depends a given body of knowledge or information.
If a scenario ω ∈Ω is assumed to hold, then we suppose that the information is given by
X(ω) ∈ L. The mapping
X :Ω→ P(L)
which assigns to each possible assumption, scenario or interpretation ω the corresponding
facts expressed by X(ω) is called an assumption-based information.
We admit that the possible assumptions Ω are specified before the assumption-based
information X becomes available. This implies that this information may render some
originally possible interpretations ω impossible. These are the interpretations, which are
in contradiction to X, that is those for which X(ω) = L. Therefore, we define the set of
inconsistent scenarios by
(2.1)IX =
{
ω ∈Ω : C(X(ω))= L}.
CX =Ω \ IX are then the consistent scenarios (relative to X).
We may ask whether some hypothesis, expressed by a sentence s ∈L or more generally
by some subset H ⊆ L could possibly be true in the light of the given information. This will
depend on the scenario or the interpretation we assume. Under a scenario ω the hypothesis
H is necessarily valid, if X(ω) H . We then consider the set of scenarios under which H
would be necessarily true (given the information): This is the set of all consistent scenarios,
which imply H :
(2.2)sX(H)=
{
ω ∈CX : X(ω) H
}= {ω ∈ CX: H ⊆ C(X(ω))}.
This is called the support for H . For technical reasons, it is convenient to introduce the so-
called quasi-support, which contains all scenarios, including the inconsistent ones, which
support H :
qsX(H)=
{
ω ∈Ω : X(ω) H}= {ω ∈Ω : H ⊆ C(X(ω))}.
Then we see that IX = qsX(L) and sX(H)= qsX(H)\qsX(L). These concepts will be im-
portant for the probabilistic structure introduced in Section 4 later. The structure presented
so far represents the logical part of our model of uncertain information.
To illustrate these basic ideas we present two small examples:
1. Sensor. A sensor should detect some alarm state (like smoke in a computer center).
It may fail in two ways: It may be unable to react to an alarm state or it may wrongly
give an alarm. We model this in propositional logic as follows: We define the propositional
variables
h alarm state (to be detected),
e alarm (evidence for alarm state),
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and the assumptional variablesok1 sensor is ok to detect alarm state,
ok2 sensor is ok not to signal not existing alarm state.
We describe the sensor system by the following logical statements:
h∧ ok1→ e,
¬ok1→¬e,
¬h∧ ok2→¬e,
¬ok2→ e.
Suppose that the alarm rings. Then we add the statement
e.
We may then verify that the only consistent scenarios are{{ok1,ok2}, {ok1,¬ok2}}.
The scenarios simply say that ok1 must be true. The single supporting scenario for the
hypothesis h that an alarm state is present is {ok1,ok2}. There is no supporting scenario
for the hypothesis ¬h that there is no alarm state despite the alarm ringing. We refer to [9]
for methods to compute such sets of consistent and supporting scenarios.
2. Noisy communication. When a signal X is transmitted through a communication
channel, then noise may disturb it, so that the output corresponds not exactly to the input.
Therefore, we may transmit the signal through two parallel channels, to be in a better
position to reconstruct the input from the output. We model this in a numerical frame
introducing the real-valued variables
X input signal,
Y1, Y2 output signals of the two channels,
and further the disturbances
ω1,ω2 noise in the two channels.
The transmission of the input signal over the two channels is then determined by
Y1 =X+ω1,
Y2 =X+ω2.
Suppose that we actually observe the values y1 and y2 for the two output signals. Then we
add the equations
Y1 = y1,
Y2 = y2.
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Then we easily find out the only consistent scenarios (ω1,ω2) are those, which satisfy the
equation
ω1 −ω2 = y1 − y2.
In order to reconstruct the input signal from the output signals we are interested in sup-
porting scenarios for hypotheses like X = x for some specified values x . It is easy to see
that there is a single supporting scenario for this hypothesis:
s
({X = x})= {(ω1,ω2): ω1 = y1 − x, ω2 = y2 − x}.
Such linear models with disturbances and methods for their computational treatment are
discussed in [19].
We may say that the larger the support set of a hypothesis, the more the hypothesis is
credible in the light of the information. But clearly this is in many cases insufficient to
measure the credibility of a hypothesis. Different scenarios, assumptions or interpretations
may have different likelihood. This is where probability enters. It serves to express the
likelihood of scenarios and to compute then the degree of support of hypotheses based on
these probabilities. In order to discuss this probabilistic structure, we need first to study the
algebraic structure of the concept of uncertain information introduced.
3. The algebraic structure of argumentation
3.1. Information algebras
If (L,) is an information system, we have said that X ⊆ L is an information. But
what is the information given by X really? Note that we may deduce further sentences
Y ⊆ C(X) from X. So Y belongs also to the information. In fact, the closure C(X) is the
whole information specified by X and X is only one possible representation of it. Any
equivalent set Y with C(Y )= C(X) would be another representation.
Therefore any closed set E ⊆ L (i.e., any set such that E = C(E)) is taken to be an
information. And any set X such that C(X)=E is a representation of information E. We
denote by LC the set of all closed sets in L. Note that L ∈LC and C(∅) ∈ LC . The former
is called the contradiction or null information, the latter the vacuous or neutral information.
We note that information can be combined. Informally, if X1 ⊆ L and X2 ⊆ L repre-
sent each some piece of information, then together X1 ∪ X2 represent the combined or
aggregated information. The corresponding pieces of information are C(X1), C(X2) and
C(X1 ∪X2). We remark that C(X1 ∪X2)= C(C(X1)∪C(X2)). Therefore, we define an
operation ⊗ of combination between information in LC by
E1 ⊗E2 = C(E1 ∪E2).
Clearly this operation is commutative and associative, i.e., LC is a commutative semigroup
under the operation ⊗. The vacuous information is the neutral element of this semigroup,
E ⊗C(∅)= C(E ∪ ∅)= C(E).
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The null information L is absorbing in the semigroup
E ⊗L=E ⊗C(L)= C(E ∪L)= C(L)= L.
Finally, the semigroup is idempotent,
E ⊗E = C(E ∪E)= C(E).
We call a commutative and idempotent semigroup (i.e., a semilattice, see below) with a
neutral and a null element an information algebra.1
In a more abstract setting, we may therefore consider an information algebra Φ , whose
generic elements will be called φ,ψ, . . . , whose neutral element is e and whose null el-
ement is denoted by z. Since Φ is idempotent, we may define a partial order between
elements of Φ: φ  ψ if, and only if φ ⊗ ψ = ψ . An information φ is less informative
than ψ , if combined with the latter, nothing new results. This is indeed a partial order, as
is easily verified. We have e φ  z for all φ ∈Φ . And in particular, we have
φ ⊗ψ = φ ∨ψ.
In fact, φ,ψ  φ ⊗ψ . Assume another upper bound η of φ and ψ . Then
(φ ⊗ψ)⊗ η = φ ⊗ (ψ ⊗ η)= φ ⊗ η= η,
hence φ ⊗ ψ  η. Henceforth we shall at convenience replace combination by the supre-
mum (the join in the semilattice). Therefore, Φ is in fact a semilattice. In the example
induced by an information system for example, E1  E2 means that E1 ⊆ E2. Note that
the semilattice induced by an information system is even complete: For any family of
closed sets Ei , i ∈ I , we have
E = C
(⋃
i∈I
Ei
)
=
∨
i∈I
Ei.
Indeed, assume F ⊇ E. Then F ⊇ Ei for all i ∈ I , hence F ⊇⋃Ei and F = C(F) ⊇
C(
⋃
Ei) = E. So, C(⋃Ei) is the supremum of the Ei . We do not assume however in
general that an information algebra is a complete semilattice.
Any information system induces an information algebra, as shown above. Let us illus-
trate this with the examples of the previous Section 2.
1. Contexts. Consider a context (M,S, |=). For A⊆M we define the intend of A
rˇ(A)= {s ∈ S: m |= s for all m ∈A}.
Then, for a B ⊆ S,
C(B)= {s ∈ S: B  s} = rˇ(rˆ(B)).
1 There is an important element missing: information relates to questions. Therefore an algebra of information
should model systems of related questions and contain an operation of focusing of information to particular
questions. This leads to a much richer algebraic structure [13,16]. Here we restrict ourselves, for the sake of
simplicity, to the case of one single fixed question.
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We refer to [12] for a proof and more details. In a similar way we define a consequence
operator in M:
C(A)= rˆ(rˇ(A)).
An information in the context (M,S, |=) is then a pair (A,B) such that A = rˆ(B) and
B = rˇ(A). Clearly, both A and B are closed sets. What we call here an information is also
called a concept in concept analysis [5].
2. Propositional logic. This system can be seen as a context (see above), where S is
the propositional language and M the set of truth functions. m |= s means that s evaluates
to true under m. In this particular context all subsets of M are closed. B  s holds, if all
models rˆ(B) are also models of s, i.e. if rˆ(B) ⊆ rˆ({s}). So C(B) = rˇ(A) and any pair
(A, rˇ(A)) represents an information. We can also determine a propositional information
from a set B of formulas by (rˆ(B),C(B)). In terms of models, combination is simply
intersection,(
A1, rˇ(A1)
)⊗ (A2, rˇ(A2))= (A1 ∩A2, rˇ(A1 ∩A2)).
3. Linear equations. Here we have again a context. M is the vector space Fn, S the
set of linear equations over n variables with coefficients in F . For x ∈ Fn and l ∈ S, the
relation x |= l means that x is a solution of l. For a system of linear equations B ⊆ S the
set rˆ(B) is the linear solution manifold of the system of equations. C(B) is the set of all
linear equations whose solution manifold contains the solution manifold of B . Conversely,
for any subset A ∈ Fn, the closure C(A) is the linear manifold spanned by the elements
of A. Combination in this context amounts to intersect linear manifolds.
Here follow a few further simple examples of information algebras, which are not de-
rived from information systems.
1. Subsets. Subsets of a reference set S form an information algebra with intersection
for combination. The set S is the neutral element of this algebra and the emptyset the null
element. We remark that this system has a Boolean structure (it is a distributive lattice with
complement), as have many other, but not all information algebras.
2. Binary strings. Let {0,1}∗ be the set of all finite binary strings. For x, y ∈ {0,1}∗
we say that x  y if x is a prefix of y (i.e., an initial substring of y). ε is the empty string,
ε  x for all x ∈ {0,1}∗. We adjoin an element z to {0,1}∗ and put Φ = {0,1}∗ ∪ {z}. We
define a combination in Φ as follows: x ⊗ y = y , if x  y , x ⊗ y = z if neither x  y nor
y  x (we say that x and y are not consistent) and x⊗z= z for all x . This is an information
algebra, albeit with a somewhat trivial combination operation.
3. Intervals. Intervals [x, y] with −∞  x  y  +∞ form an information algebra
with intersection for combination, if we add the empty interval as null element.
An ideal in an information algebra Φ is a subset I ⊆Φ , such that
(1) ψ  φ ∈ I implies ψ ∈ I ,
(2) φ,ψ ∈ I implies φ ⊗ψ ∈ I .
The set {ψ ∈Φ: ψ  φ} is an ideal I (φ), a so-called principal ideal. Note that every ideal
contains e. An ideal different from Φ is called proper. We may combine ideals by
I1 ⊗ I2 = {φ ∈Φ: φ  φ1 ⊗ φ2 for some φ1 ∈ I1, φ2 ∈ I2}.
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This is clearly an ideal. This operation is commutative and associative and the ideal I (e)
is the neutral element, Φ the null element. Thus the set of ideals I (Φ) of an information
algebra Φ is itself an information algebra. The mapping φ → I (φ) is an embedding, since
e → I (e) and I (z)=Φ , I (φ)= I (ψ) implies φ =ψ and clearly
I (φ ⊗ψ)= I (φ)⊗ I (ψ).
Therefore, we consider I (Φ) as an extension of Φ , its completion. Note then that in I (Φ)
we have φ  I , if, and only if, φ ∈ I .
Lemma 1. For all I1, I2 ∈ I (Φ),
(3.1)I1 ⊗ I2 =
∨
{φ1 ⊗ φ2: φ1 ∈ I1, φ2 ∈ I2}.
Proof. For all φ ∈ I1 ⊗ I2 we have by definition of I1 ⊗ I2 a φ1 ∈ I1 and a φ2 ∈ I2 such
that φ  φ1 ⊗ φ2. Therefore
I1 ⊗ I2 
∨
{φ1 ⊗ φ2: φ1 ∈ I1, φ2 ∈ I2}.
But
{φ1 ⊗ φ2: φ1 ∈ I1, φ2 ∈ I2}
⊆ {φ ∈Φ: φ  φ1 ⊗ φ2 for some φ1 ∈ I1, φ2 ∈ I2}.
Hence we see that
I1 ⊗ I2 
∨
{φ1 ⊗ φ2: φ1 ∈ I1, φ2 ∈ I2}.
This proves the identity (3.1). ✷
We show next that to any information algebra Φ , we can associate an information sys-
tem. In fact let L = Φ . We define an entailment relation Φ for X ⊆ Φ and φ ∈ Φ as
follows:
X Φ φ if, and only if, there is F ⊆X, finite
(3.2)such that φ 
⊗
ψ∈F
ψ.
This is indeed an entailment relation as can easily be verified. Therefore, we have an infor-
mation system (Φ,Φ) induced by an information algebra Φ . Its associated consequence
operator is denoted by CΦ . We remark that CΦ(∅)= I (e), since we interpret the combina-
tion of an empty family of information as e. Further we note that CΦ(X) is an ideal in Φ .
We call this ideal I (X), the ideal generated by a subset X of Φ . So, the closed sets of this
information systems are exactly the ideals of Φ . As we know this is an information algebra
I (Φ). The following theorem shows that it is also the information algebra induced by the
information system (Φ,Φ).
Theorem 1 [13]. If Φ is an information algebra, we have, for X1,X2 ⊆Φ
CΦ(X1 ∪X2)= I (X1)⊗ I (X2).
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Proof. Suppose φ ∈ CΦ(X1 ∪X2). Then there is a finite set F ⊆ X1 ∪X2 such that φ ⊗
ψ∈F ψ . Let F1 = F ∩X1 and F2 = F ∩X2. Then F1 and F2 are finite and subsets of X1
and X2 respectively. Define
ψ1 =
⊗
ψ∈F1
ψ, ψ2 =
⊗
ψ∈F2
ψ.
Then we have ψ1 ∈ I (X1), ψ2 ∈ I (X2) and φ ψ1 ⊗ψ2, hence φ ∈ I (X1)⊗ I (X2).
Conversely, if φ ∈ I (X1)⊗ I (X2), then φ ψ1 ⊗ψ2 for ψ1 ∈ I (X1) and ψ2 ∈ I (X2).
There are then finite sets F1 ⊆X1 and F2 ⊆X2 such that
ψ1 
⊗
ψ∈F1
ψ, ψ2 
⊗
ψ∈F2
ψ.
But then it follows that
φ 
⊗
ψ∈F1∪F2
ψ
and F1 ∪F2 ⊆X1 ∪X2, finite. Therefore, φ ∈CΦ(X1 ∪X2). ✷
According to this theorem, the information algebra induced by the information system
(Φ,Φ) is the completion I (Φ) of the algebra Φ . Hence information systems and infor-
mation algebras are two sides of the same coin and we may work with information systems
or information algebras at our convenience.
3.2. Compact systems
If we express information in an information system (L,), then we can effectively
only express information by finite sets X ⊆ L. However, we would want to express any
information at least approximatively by an effective information. This is achieved in a
compact information system, where the following additional property of the entailment
relation is satisfied:
If X  s, then there is a finite subset F ⊆X such that F  s.
The corresponding consequence operator C has then the following additional property as
is well-known [5]
C(X)=
⋃{
C(F): F ⊆X, F finite}.
Such a consequence operator is called compact too. The closed sets C(X), where X is fi-
nite, i.e., finitely axiomatizable sets, can be considered as the information which is “finite”
or effective. All other information can be approximated by the union above, because if
F1,F2 ⊆ X are finite sets, then F1 ∪ F2 ⊆ X is a finite set, which gives a better approxi-
mation.
We claim that this compact information algebra LC is an instance of the following
algebraic structure: Suppose Φ an information algebra. Then a subset D ⊆ Φ is called
directed, if for φ,ψ ∈ D there is an upper bound η ∈ D such that φ,ψ  η. Assume
Φf ⊆Φ a subset of “finite” elements such that the following is satisfied:
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(1) Finitary semigroup. φ,ψ ∈Φf implies φ ⊗ψ ∈Φf , and e ∈Φf .
(2) Convergence. If D ⊆Φf is a directed set, then∨D exists and belongs to Φ .
(3) Density. For all φ ∈Φ ,
φ =
∨
{ψ ∈Φf : ψ  φ}.
(4) Compactness. If D ⊆Φf is a directed set, and φ ∈Φf such that φ ∨D, then there
is a ψ ∈D such that φ ψ .
Such an information algebra (Φ,Φf ) is called finitary or compact. The following theorem
is proved in [13,16]:
Theorem 2. Let (Φ,Φf ) be a finitary information algebra. Then
(1) Φ is a complete lattice.
(2) φ ∈Φf if, and only if, for all directed subsets D ⊆Φ , φ ∨D implies that there is a
ψ ∈D such that φ ψ .
The second property in this theorem says that elements of Φf are “finite” in the sense
of order or lattice theory. The theorem together with the density property above says then
that Φ is an algebraic lattice. This is sometimes also called a domain, although in domain
theory the concept of domain can take slightly different meanings. But in any way this
shows that information algebras are closely connected to domain theory, even if its focus
is different from domain theory. It has been proved in [13,16] that the information algebra
induced by a compact information system is compact. And its finite elements are just the
closed sets C(X) with X finite.
The next theorem tells us that a compact information algebra can always be obtained by
completion of an arbitrary information algebra.
Theorem 3 [13]. Let Φ be an information algebra, I (Φ) its completion. Then (I (Φ),Φ)
is a compact information algebra, whose finite elements are Φ .
Inversely, to a compact information algebra a compact information system can be as-
sociated as follows: The set of tokens is Φf . The consequence operator Cφ is defined for
X ⊆Φf by
CΦ(X)=
{
ψ ∈Φf : ψ 
∨
X
}
.
This is indeed a compact consequence operator on Φf [13,16]. Let us define Aφ = {ψ ∈
Φf : ψ  φ}. Then we have A∨X := CΦ(X). The associated entailment relation is simply
X Φ ψ if, and only if, ψ ∨X. (Φf ,Φ) is the compact information system associated
with the compact information algebra (Φ,Φf ).
Let φ =∨X and ψ =∨Y . Then, in the information algebra induced by (Φf ,Φ)
combination is defined by
CΦ(X)⊗CΦ(Y )= CΦ(Aφ ∪Aψ)=Aφ⊗ψ,
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since
∨
(Aφ∪Aψ)= φ⊗ψ . So, the mapping φ →Aφ fromΦ to C(Φf ) is one-to-one andmaintains combination. Also e →Ae = CΦ(∅), since∨∅ = e, and z →Az =Φf . Further,
φ ∈ Φf maps to Aφ = CΦ({φ}), i.e., to a finitely axiomatizable set. This shows that the
information algebra C(Φf ) induced by the information system (Φf ,Φ) is isomorph to
the original finitary information algebra (Φ,Φf ). Thus, we have proved the following
theorem:
Theorem 4 [13]. If (Φ,Φf ) is a compact information algebra, then the system (Φf ,Φ)
is a compact information system. The compact information algebra induced by this infor-
mation system is isomorphic to (Φ,Φf ).
Here follow a few examples of compact information algebras.
1. Subsets. If intersection is the combination operation for subsets, then cofinite sets
(sets of the form S \ F , with F finite) are the finite elements of a compact information
algebra. Dually, we may take union as combination. Then finite sets are the finite elements
of the algebra.
2. Binary strings. If we add the infinite strings to {0,1}∗ we get the set {0,1}∗∗ of
finite and infinite binary strings. We note that all strings (finite or not) may be identified
with the family of their initial strings. Then {0,1}∗∗ can be identified with the ideals of
{0,1}∗. Thus it becomes clear that {0,1}∗∗ is the completion of {0,1}∗, and that {0,1}∗∗ is
a compact information algebra with the finite strings as finite elements.
3. Intervals. We may consider intervals with rational bounds −∞  x  y  +∞
(we consider here −∞ and +∞ as rational numbers). These intervals form an information
algebra under intersection. The algebra of intervals with real bounds is then its completion,
since each such interval may be identified with the ideal of the rational intervals in which
it is contained.
4. Vector spaces. Consider a vector space V and define for A⊆ V , v ∈ V the entail-
ment relation A  v if v is an element of the linear manifold spanned by some finite set
B ⊆ A. Then this generates the compact information algebra of linear manifolds with in-
tersection as combination.
4. The probability structure
4.1. Simple probability structures
We consider now uncertain information, i.e., assumption-based information again. Let
Ω be a set of possible assumptions, scenarios or interpretations and X(ω) the information
asserted, if scenario ω is assumed. Let then
ω →C(X(ω))
be the corresponding mapping from Ω into the information algebra LC . To each scenario
ω, the information C(X(ω)) is associated. In order to study such mappings, we consider
more generally an information algebra Φ and mappingsX :Ω→Φ . Similarly to (2.2), for
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a hypothesis φ ∈Φ , we may define the set of supporting scenarios
sX(φ)=
{
ω ∈Ω : φ X(ω)}.
Note that we do at this place not eliminate inconsistent assumptions (see Section 2). This
very important issue will be taken up in Section 4.5. For the time being we work for tech-
nical reasons in fact with quasi-supports and content ourselves to state that this will be the
basis for the semantically more important supports.
If we have an assumption-based information structure X :Ω → Φ , we may judge hy-
potheses φ ∈Φ by the support sX(φ) allocated to them. The larger this support, the more
credible or likely is a hypothesis. This is however a purely qualitative point of view. Not all
scenarios ω ∈Ω may be equally likely. A hypothesis which is supported by many unlikely
scenarios may finally be less credible than another one, which is supported by few sce-
narios only, but highly likely ones. In order to take this into consideration we may assign
probabilities to scenarios. This is the subject of this section. If we assume Ω to be a finite or
countably infinite set, then the mappings introduced above are fine. But already in applica-
tions like linear equations with Gaussian disturbances, this simple case is no more present.
Then questions of measurability arise. And the general mappings considered above are too
general to be useful. We need to restrict them to more reasonable categories. In this section
we introduce first a very simple class of mappings, which will be generalized in the next
section.
We assume a probability space (Ω,A,P ) with a σ -algebra A in Ω and a probability
measure P on it. Based on such a probability space we introduce first a finite probability
structure.
Definition 1. A simple probability structure (s.p.s.) is given by{
ψ1 . . . ψm
A1 . . . Am
}
where the {A1, . . . ,Am} form a decomposition of Ω , Ai ∈A, P(Ai) > 0 for i = 1, . . . ,m
and ψi ∈ Φ for i = 1, . . . ,m and ψi = ψj for i = j . The elements ψi are called focal
elements.
To a s.p.s. we associate a simple random variable (s.r.v.) X :Ω→Φ , defined by
X(ω)=ψi, ∀ω ∈Ai.
And we associate also a support mapping sX :Φ→A defined by
sX(φ)=
⋃
i: ψiφ
Ai =
{
ω: φ X(ω)
}
, ∀φ ∈Φ.
We consider two s.r.v.sX and X′ to be equal, X =X′, if X(ω)=X′(ω) almost everywhere
(a.e., i.e., except of a set of measure zero). Then, correspondingly, we take two support
mappings s and s′ to be equal s = s′, if for all φ ∈Φ the symmetric difference s(φ)!s′(φ)
is a set of measure zero. So, to each s.r.v.X, a support mapping sX is associated andX =X′
implies sX = sX′ . We write H ⊆a.s. H ′ (H is almost surely contained in H ′) if H ′ \H is of
measure zero.
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We denote by Xs the set of all s.r.v.s (equal variables assumed to be identical) and by Ss
the corresponding support functions. Note that we have a one to one mapping X → sX
between the two sets. We are going to introduce an operation of combination into the two
sets. We do this by defining a combination operation between two s.p.s.:{
ψ11 . . . ψ1r
A11 . . . A1r
}
⊗
{
ψ21 . . . ψ2s
A21 . . . A2s
}
=
{
ψ1 . . . ψm
A1 . . . Am
}
where ψk = ψ1i ⊗ ψ2j for some i and j , and Ak = ⋃{A1i ∩ A2j : ψ1i ⊗ ψ2j = ψk},
P(Ak) > 0 for k = 1, . . . ,m. This is again a s.p.s. Let X and sX be the s.r.v. and the sup-
port mapping associated to this s.p.s., whereas X1, X2 and sX1 , sX2 are the s.r.v.s and the
support mappings associated with the two original s.p.s. Then we define X1 ⊗ X2 := X
and sX1 ⊗ sX1 := sX . Note that sX1 ⊗ sX2 = sX1⊗X2 . The s.r.v. e(ω)= e for all ω and the
corresponding support mapping se(φ)= ∅ for all φ = e and se(e)=Ω are the neutral el-
ements of this combination operation, whereas the s.r.v. z(ω) = z and the corresponding
support function sz(φ) =Ω are the null elements of the combination. Clearly the opera-
tion is commutative and associative. Therefore Xs and Ss are two isomorphic information
algebras.
We may express combination of s.r.v.s and support mappings also more directly, as the
following lemma shows.
Lemma 2. For all X1,X2 ∈ Xs and for all ω ∈Ω ,
(4.1)(X1 ⊗X2)(ω)=X1(ω)⊗X2(ω).
For all s1, s2 ∈ Ss and for all φ ∈Φ ,
(4.2)(s1 ⊗ s2)(φ)=
⋃
φφ1⊗φ2
{
s1(φ1)∩ s2(φ2)
}
.
Proof. We have
(X1 ⊗X2)(ω)=ψ1i ⊗ψ2j =X1(ω)⊗X2(ω)
for ω ∈A1i ∩A2j . So (4.1) holds everywhere.
Further let X1 and X2 be the s.r.v.s associated with s1 and s2 such that s1⊗s2 = sX1⊗X2 .
Then, we obtain for all φ, using the first part of the lemma
sX1⊗X2(φ)=
{
ω: φ X1(ω)⊗X2(ω)
}
= {ω: φ  φ1 ⊗ φ2, φ1 X1(ω), φ2 X2(ω)}
=
⋃
φφ1⊗φ2
({
ω: φ1 X1(ω)
} ∩ {ω: φ2 X2(ω)})
=
⋃
φφ1⊗φ2
{
s1(φ1) ∩ s2(φ2)
}
. ✷
In both algebras Xs and Ss we have a partial order. The next lemma shows how this
order is characterized.
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Lemma 3. We have X′ X if, and only if, X′(ω)X(ω) a.e. and, for s, s′ ∈ S , we have
s′  s if, and only if, for all φ ∈Φ we have s′(φ)⊆a.s. s(φ).
Proof. X′  X means X′ ⊗ X = X, which in turn implies X′(ω) ⊗ X(ω) = X(ω) for
almost all ω, hence X′(ω)X(ω). The converse follows in the same way.
Let further X and X′ be the s.r.v.s associated with the support mappings s and s′. Then
s′  s implies s′ ⊗ s = sX′⊗X = sX = s. Since the mapping X → sX is an isomorphism,
this implies X′ ⊗X =X or X′ X. Therefore, we have, by the first part of the lemma, for
all φ ∈Φ
sX′(φ)=
{
ω: φ X′(ω)
}⊆a.s. {ω: φ X(ω)}= sX(φ).
Conversely, assume that the inclusion above holds for all φ. Take φ =X′(ω). Then it can
be seen that φ =X′(ω)X(ω) for almost all ω. But this implies according to the first part
of the lemma that X′ X, hence sX′  sX . ✷
In order to avoid subsequently tedious measurability considerations, we associate a
probability algebra (B,µ) to the probability space (Ω,A,P ) in a classical way [10,11]:
Take N to be the σ -ideal of P -null sets and define B = A/N to be the quotient algebra
of the equivalence classes of measurable sets modulo N (two sets A and A′ are equiva-
lent modulo N , if the symmetric difference A!A′ ∈N ). Then B is a complete Boolean
algebra with least element ⊥ and top element #. Furthermore, the Boolean algebra sat-
isfies the so-called countable chain condition, which means that for every subset E ⊆ B
there is a countable subset D of E such that
∧
E =∧D. There is also countable subset
D of E such that
∨
E =∨D. And the mapping π :A→ B defined by π(A)= [A] ([A]
denotes the equivalence class of A) is a σ -homomorphism. On B we define a measure µ
by µ(π(A))= P(A). This measure is positive, i.e., µ(b)= 0 implies b =⊥. (B,µ) is the
probability algebra associated with (Ω,A,P ).
Definition 2. A basic probability assignment (b.p.a.) is given by{
ψ1 . . . ψm
b1 . . . bm
}
where the {b1, . . . , bm} form a decomposition of B, with µ(bi) > 0 and ψi ∈ Φ for i =
1, . . . ,m and ψi =ψj for i = j . The elements ψi are still called focal elements.
To each s.p.s. a b.p.a. with the same focal sets ψi and bi = π(Ai) is associated. Each
b.p.a. induces a mapping h : {b1, . . . , bm} → Φ , defined by h(bi) = ψi and a mapping
ρ :Φ→ B defined by
(4.3)ρ(φ)=
∨
φψi
bi .
We call the mapping h still a simple random variable (s.r.v.). Equal random variablesX and
X′ correspond to the same h and induce the same ρ. The mapping ρ is called an allocation
of probability (a.o.p.). The set of s.r.v.s h will be denoted by Hs and the set of a.o.p.s
by Rs . We clearly have one-to-one mappings between Hs and Rs , as well as between Hs
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and Xs andRs and Ss . Just as we have defined an operation of combination between s.p.s.
we define such an operation between b.p.a.s:{
ψ11 . . . ψ1r
b11 . . . b1r
}
⊗
{
ψ21 . . . ψ2s
b21 . . . b2s
}
=
{
ψ1 . . . ψm
b1 . . . bm
}
where ψk = ψ1i ⊗ ψ2j for some i and j , and bk =∨{b1i ∧ b2j : ψ1i ⊗ ψ2j = ψk} = ⊥
for k = 1, . . . ,m. This is clearly again a b.p.a. Simple probability structures and basic
probability assignments are simply two different ways to describe essentially (up to sets of
measure zero) the same situation of uncertainty. The associated s.r.v.s X and h, the support
mapping s and the allocation of probability ρ are still other ways to describe the same
situation. We shall therefore henceforth take X as the identifying element of the situation
and write hX , sX and ρX to denote the corresponding other elements referring to the same
situation. Note that ρX = π ◦ sX and that
hX1 ⊗ hX2 = hX1⊗X2 , sX1 ⊗ sX2 = sX1⊗X2 ,
ρX1 ⊗ ρX2 = ρX1⊗X2 .
he, se and ρe are the neutral elements of the corresponding combination operation and hz,
sz and ρz are the null elements. Thus, the mappings X → hX, X → sX and X → ρX are
isomorphisms.
We may define the combination in Rs in a more direct way, as we did it for Ss in
Lemma 2 above:
Lemma 4. For all ρ1, ρ2 ∈Rs and for all φ ∈Φ ,
(ρ1 ⊗ ρ2)(φ)=
∨
φφ1⊗φ2
{
ρ1(φ1)∧ ρ2(φ2)
}
.
For the proof, we refer to [13, Theorem 7.17].
There is a partial order both in Hs and Rs . These orders can be characterized as
shown in the following lemma (which parallels Lemma 3). We say that a partition
b = {b1, . . . , bm} of B is finer than another one b′ = {b′1, . . . , b′m}, b′  b, if for every i
there is a j such that bi  b′j .
Lemma 5. If h and h′ are s.r.v.s, then h′  h, if, and only if, b′  b, and h′(b′j ) h(bi),
whenever bi  b′j . If ρ and ρ′ are a.o.p.s, then ρ′  ρ if, and only if, for all φ ∈ Φ ,
ρ′(φ) ρ(φ).
Proof. If h′  h, then h′ ⊗ h = h, such that b′  b and h′(b′j ) ⊗ h(bi) = h(bi), i.e.,
h′(b′j )  h(bi), if bi  b′j . Conversely, if b′  b and h′(b′j )  h(bi), whenever bi  b′j ,
then h′(b′j )⊗ h(bi)= h(bi) and indeed h′ ⊗ h= h, or h′  h.
Let ρ′  ρ such that ρ′ ⊗ ρ = ρ or, for all φ ∈ Φ , (ρ′ ⊗ ρ)(φ) = ρ(φ). Then (see
Lemma 4 above),
(ρ′ ⊗ ρ)(φ)=
∨
φφ1⊗φ2
{
ρ′(φ1)∧ ρ(φ2)
}= ρ(φ).
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We have therefore ρ′(φ1) ∧ ρ(φ2) ρ(φ), if φ  φ1 ⊗ φ2. Take then φ1 = φ and φ2 = e,
to obtain ρ′(φ)∧ ρ(e) ρ(φ). But ρ(e)=#, such that indeed ρ′(φ) ρ(φ). Conversely,
if ρ′(φ) ρ(φ) for all φ ∈Φ , then we have
(ρ′ ⊗ ρ)(φ)=
∨
φφ1⊗φ2
{
ρ′(φ1)∧ ρ(φ2)
}

∨
φφ1⊗φ2
{
ρ(φ1)∧ ρ(φ2)
}= (ρ ⊗ ρ)(φ)= ρ(φ).
But we have always ρ  ρ′ ⊗ ρ, such that, by what we just proved, ρ(φ)  (ρ′ ⊗ ρ)(φ)
for all φ. Hence we conclude that (ρ′ ⊗ ρ)(φ) = ρ(φ) for all φ, and thus ρ = ρ′ ⊗ ρ or
ρ′  ρ. ✷
We can assign probabilities to the support of any φ ∈Φ . If X is a s.r.v. then we define
dsX(φ)= P
(
sX(φ)
)= µ(ρX(φ)).
The larger this probability, the more credible is φ in the light of the information given by
the s.r.v. X or the more is φ supported by this information. Therefore, dsX(φ) is called
the degree of support of φ. We shall come back to degrees of support more in detail in
Section 4.4. But before, we need to extend the notion of a random variable.
4.2. Random variables
Consider the algebra Xs of simple random variables in a information algebra Φ . If
X ⊆ Xs is an ideal in Xs , then we may consider X as an element of the completion I (Xs )
ofXs . We call any such ideal X ⊆Xs a random variable (r.v.) in the information algebraΦ .
We remark immediately that, for all ω ∈Ω ,
X(ω)= {X′(ω): X′ ∈X}
is an ideal in Φ and X(ω) is an element of the completion of I (Φ) of Φ . So, random
variables may be considered as mappings from Ω into I (Φ). As before, we consider two
r.v.sX and X′ as equal, if in I (Φ) we haveX(ω)=X′(ω) for almost all ω. Let X be the set
of all random variables (equal variables identified), then (Xs ,X ) is a compact information
algebra.
Next we associate support mappings sX with random variables X: For all X ∈ X , the
set
sX =
{
sX′ : X
′ ∈X}
is an ideal in Ss , hence an element of the completion I (Ss ) of Ss . Let I (Ss ) = S . Then
(Ss ,S) is again a compact information algebra. We associate with sX a mapping Φ →
P(Ω) from Φ into the power sets of Ω :
(4.4)sX(φ)=
{
ω ∈Ω : φ ∈X(ω)}= ⋃
X′∈X
sX′(φ).
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We claim that the mapping X → sX is one-to-one. In fact, assume that sX = sY . Then
we have for all φ ∈Φ{
ω ∈Ω : φ ∈X(ω)}= {ω ∈Ω : φ ∈ Y (ω)}.
Fix an ω and take φ =X′(ω) ∈X(ω). Then the identity above implies X′(ω) ∈ Y (ω), such
that X(ω) ⊆ Y (ω). In the same way we see that Y (ω) ⊆ X(ω). Hence we have X(ω) =
Y (ω) for all ω ∈Ω , thus X = Y . The map maps X also onto S . Therefore, if we introduce
an operation of combination into S by
sX ⊗ sY := sX⊗Y
the map becomes a homomorphism, hence an isomorphism between the compact informa-
tion algebras (Xs ,X ) and (Ss ,S).
The combination operation in S can, as before, be expressed more explicitly (compare
(4.2)).
Lemma 6. For all φ ∈Φ , X,Y ∈X ,
(sX ⊗ sY )(φ)=
⋃
φφ1⊗φ2
{
sX(φ1)∩ sY (φ2)
}
.
Proof. We have, by definition and by (4.4),
(sX ⊗ sY )(φ)= sX⊗Y (φ)=
⋃
Z′∈X⊗Y
sZ′(φ).
Consider a ω ∈ sZ′(φ) such that φ  Z′(ω). But Z′ ∈X⊗ Y means that there are X′ ∈X
and Y ′ ∈ Y such that Z′ X′ ⊗ Y ′, hence Z′(ω)X′(ω)⊗ Y ′(ω) a.e. (Lemmas 3 and 2).
Therefore we see that ω ∈ sX′⊗Y ′(φ). Since X′ ⊗ Y ′ ∈ X ⊗ Y if X′ ∈ X and Y ′ ∈ Y , we
conclude that (Lemma 2)
(sX ⊗ sY )(φ)=
⋃
X′∈X,Y ′∈Y
sX′⊗Y ′(φ)
=
⋃
X′∈X,Y ′∈Y
⋃
φφ1⊗φ2
{
sX′(φ1)∩ sY ′(φ2)
}
=
⋃
φφ1⊗φ2
{( ⋃
X′∈X
sX′(φ1)
)
∩
( ⋃
Y ′∈Y
sY ′(φ2)
)}
=
⋃
φφ1⊗φ2
{
sX(φ1)∩ sY (φ2)
}
. ✷
The combination operation is closely related to the partial order. We can express this
order also in different ways.
Lemma 7. The following statements are all equivalent: For X,Y ∈ X ,
(1) X  Y ,
(2) for almost all ω ∈Ω , X(ω) Y (ω) in I (Φ),
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(3) sX  sY in S ,
(4) for all φ ∈Φ , sX(φ)⊆a.s. sY (φ).
Proof. The equivalence between (1) and (3) follows from the isomorphism between X
and S .
To prove the equivalence between statements (1) and (2) assume first that X  Y , or
if we look at X and Y as ideals, X ⊆ Y . This means that X′ ∈ X implies X′ ∈ Y . Hence
for almost all ω we have X′(ω) ∈ Y (ω), which means X(ω) ⊆ Y (ω) or X(ω)  Y (ω).
Conversely, assume (2). Then X′ ∈ Y for all X′ ∈X, hence X  Y .
To prove the equivalence of the third and fourth statements assume first that sX  sY ,
hence X  Y or, if we see X and Y as ideals, X ⊆ Y . This means that, for all ω ∈Ω , we
have X(ω)⊆a.s. Y (ω). This in turn implies for all φ ∈Φ ,
sX(φ)=
{
ω: φ ∈X(ω)}⊆a.s. {ω: φ ∈ Y (ω)}= sY (φ).
Conversely, assume that for all φ ∈Φ we have that sX(φ)⊆a.s. sY (φ). Then, by Lemma 6
(sX ⊗ sY )(φ)=
⋃
φφ1⊗φ2
{
sX(φ1)∩ sY (φ2)
}
⊆a.s.
⋃
φφ1⊗φ2
{
sY (φ1)∩ sY (φ2)
}= sY (φ).
But sX⊗sY  sY implies by the first part of the proof that (sX⊗sY )(φ)⊇ sY (φ). Therefore
we conclude that (sX⊗ sY )(φ)= sY (φ) for all φ ∈Φ , hence sX⊗ sY = sY or sX  sY . ✷
The following theorem gives important properties of support mappings.
Theorem 5. A support mapping sX :Φ→ P(Ω) has the following properties:
(1) sX(e)=Ω ,
(2) For all φ,ψ ∈Φ , we have
(4.5)sX(φ ⊗ψ)= sX(φ)∩ sX(ψ).
Proof. (1) is evident. We prove (2) first for simple random variables X′. In order to do
this, we note that{
ω: φ ⊗ψ X′(ω)}= {ω: φ,ψ X′(ω)}
= {ω: φ X′(ω)}∩ {ω: ψ X′(ω)}.
This shows then that sX′(φ⊗ψ)= sX′(φ)∩ sX′ (ψ). In the general case, we have therefore
sX(φ ⊗ψ)=
⋃
X′∈X
sX′(φ ⊗ψ)=
⋃
X′∈X
{
sX′(φ)∩ sX′(ψ)
}
=
( ⋃
X′∈X
sX′(φ)
)
∩
( ⋃
X′∈X
sX′(ψ)
)
= sX(φ)∩ sX(ψ). ✷
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As in the case of simple random variables we would like to use the support mapping
sX of a random variable X to determine the distribution function of X, i.e., P(sX(φ)).
This would measure the degree of support assigned to an information φ by the random
variable X. Unfortunately however sX(φ) will not be measurable in general, and the
probability P(sX(φ)) therefore not defined. We may nevertheless consider any measur-
able subset A ∈ A of Ω , which is contained in sX(φ) as an “argument” supporting φ.
Hence, the degree of support dsX(φ) for φ should be at least P(A) for all such sets A, i.e.,
dsX(φ)  P(A). In the absence of other information we may therefore tentatively define
dsX(φ) as the supremum of all these probabilities,
(4.6)dsX(φ)= sup
{
P(A): A ∈A, A⊆ sX(φ)
}= P∗(sX(φ)).
P∗ is the inner probability measure of P . We shall in the following subsection further study
and justify this definition of the degree of support of elements of φ.
4.3. Allocation of probability
For simple random variables X′ we have already defined the allocation of probability
(a.o.p.) by ρX′ = π ◦ sX′ . If we want to extend this definition to random variables X, we
have two possibilities:
(a) Either we first extend the map π :A→ B to the power set of Ω . This can, guided
by (4.6), be done as follows: For all H ⊆Ω define,
(4.7)ρ0(H)=
∨{
π(A): A ∈A, A⊆H}.
We may then define ρX = ρ0 ◦ sX . Since, for all A ∈A we have ρ0(A)= π(A), this is an
extension of the definition of a.o.p. for s.r.v. to random variables (r.v.).
(b) Alternatively, we may consider for all X′ ∈ X the probability ρX′(φ) allocated to
a fixed information φ. The probability ρX(φ) allocated to φ by X should be then at least
ρX′(φ) if X′ ∈X. Then we may define ρX(φ) as the supremum of all ρX′(φ),
(4.8)ρX(φ)=
∨
X′∈X
ρX′(φ).
As the following theorem shows, the two definitions are in fact identical.
Theorem 6. For all φ ∈Φ ,
(4.9)ρ0
(
sX(φ)
)= ∨
X′∈X
ρX′(φ).
Proof. By definition, we have
ρ0
(
sX(φ)
)=∨{π(A): A ∈A, A⊆ sX(φ)}
and ρX′(φ) = π(sX′(φ)) for X′ ∈ X. By Lemma 7, X′ ∈ X, which means that X′  X
in X , implies that sX′(φ) ⊆a.s. sX(φ) for all φ. Since ρ0 is monotone we conclude that
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ρX′(φ)= ρ0(sX′(φ)) ρ0(sX(φ)), hence
(4.10)ρ0
(
sX(φ)
)

∨
X′∈X
ρX′(φ)
for all φ ∈Φ .
Fix now φ ∈ Φ . Then there exists a countable family of s.r.v.s {X′i  X, i = 1,2, . . .}
such that
∞∨
i=1
ρX′i (φ)=
∨
X′∈X
ρX′(φ).
Let Ai = sX′i (φ) ∈A and A=
⋃∞
i=1Ai ∈A. Then we have
∞∨
i=1
ρX′i (φ)=
∞∨
i=1
π(Ai)= π
( ∞⋃
i=1
Ai
)
= π(A),
since π is a σ -homomorphism. Thus we have
∨
X′∈X ρX′(φ)= π(A).
Further there exists a countable family {Bi : Bi ∈ A, Bi ⊆ sX(φ), i = 1,2, . . .} such
that
ρ0
(
sX(φ)
)= ∞∨
i=1
π(Bi)= π
( ∞⋃
i=1
Bi
)
= π(B),
where B =⋃∞i=1 Bi ⊆ sX(φ) and B ∈A.
We claim that A!B ∈N , such that π(A)= π(B). This would then prove the theorem.
We have already seen that π(A) π(B) which implies that π(A∪B)= π(B). There-
fore we conclude that A\B ∈N . We can neglect this part and suppose that A⊆ B . Assume
now that A!B = B \A /∈N . This means that P(B \A) > 0. We define a s.r.v.
X′0(ω)=
{
φ for ω ∈A0 = B \A,
e for ω ∈Ω \A0.
Then, for all ω ∈ B we have φ  X(ω). Hence, for all ω ∈ Ω we have X′0(ω)  X(ω),
hence X′0 X or X′0 ∈X (Lemma 7). This implies
π(A)=
∨
X′∈X
ρX′(φ)= ρX′0(φ)∨
( ∨
X′∈X
ρX′(φ)
)
= π(A0)∨ π(A)= π(A0 ∪A).
But this is a contradiction, since A0 ∩A= ∅ and P(A0) > 0.
Therefore, for all φ ∈Φ , we have π(A)= π(B) which proves the theorem. ✷
This theorem is a strong justification for the definition of the a.o.p. associated to a r.v. X
by either of the two definitions given above. This justification is enforced by the following
two results, which have been proved in [13].
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Theorem 7 [13]. For all r.v.s X,Y ∈ X , and for all φ ∈Φ
(4.11)ρX⊗Y (φ)=
∨
φφ1⊗φ2
{
ρX(φ1)∧ ρY (φ2)
}
.
As for support mappings, we may define an operation of combination between a.o.p.s
by
ρX ⊗ ρY := ρX⊗Y .
Theorem 7 allows then to express this operation in a more explicit form. It shows also that
the algebraRs of a.o.p.s of simple random variables is a subalgebra of the algebra ofR of
a.o.p.s of random variables. And the mappingX → ρX is a homomorphism. The following
lemma extends Lemma 7.
Lemma 8. The following statements are all equivalent:
(1) X  Y in X ,
(2) ρX  ρY in R,
(3) for all φ ∈Φ , ρX(φ) ρY (φ).
Proof. (1)⇒ (2) follows since X  Y means X⊗ Y = Y , hence ρX ⊗ ρY = ρX⊗Y = ρY ,
hence ρX  ρY in R.
Assume then (2), that is ρX⊗Y = ρY . By Theorem 7 for all φ ∈Φ ,
ρX⊗Y (φ)=
∨
φφ1⊗φ2
{
ρX(φ1)∧ ρY (φ2)
}= ρY (φ).
If we take φ1 = φ and φ2 = e, then this implies that ρX(φ) ρY (φ), hence (3).
Assume finally (3). This means ρ0(sX(φ))  ρ0(sY (φ)) for all φ. This implies
sX(φ)⊆a.s. sY (φ). From Lemma 7 follows then that X Y . ✷
This lemma implies that the map X → ρX from X to R is one-to-one and onto, hence
an isomorphism.
Theorem 8 [13]. For all X ∈X the corresponding a.o.p. ρX has the following properties:
(1) ρX(e)=#.
(2) For all φ,ψ ∈Φ ,
(4.12)ρX(φ ⊗ψ)= ρX(φ)∧ ρX(ψ).
As a consequence of (2) of this theorem we note that φ ψ implies ρX(ψ)= ρX(φ ⊗
ψ)= ρ(φ)∧ ρ(ψ), hence ρX(ψ) ρX(φ).
Shafer [24,26] calls a map from a Boolean algebra into a probability algebra with the
properties of Theorem 8 an allocation of probability. We adapt this terminology for the
more general case of information algebras. Shafer shows that a.o.p.s are related to belief
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functions, a term coined by him for the lower probabilities introduced by Dempster [7].
This connection will be pursued in the next subsection within our framework of r.v.s in
information algebras.
4.4. Belief functions
Given a random variable X, we may define the degrees of support assigned by X to an
element φ ∈Φ by
dsX(φ)= µ
(
ρX(φ)
)
.
In this way every φ ∈Φ has a degree of support assigned, independently of the measura-
bility of sX(φ). If we consider the degree of support dsX(φ) which a r.v. X assigns to an
information φ as a mapping dsX :Φ→[0,1], i.e., as a function of φ, then we call dsX the
support function associated with the r.v. X. It plays a role similar to a distribution function
of a r.v. X. In this section we study these functions.
First we consider the case of a simple random variable X′ associated with a basic prob-
ability assignment (b.p.a.){
ψ1 . . . ψm
b1 . . . bm
}
.
To the focal elements ψi we associate the probabilities mi = µ(bi). Then we have
mi > 0 for i = 1, . . . ,m,
m∑
i=1
mi = 1.
We obtain then the following support function, if we use (4.3):
(4.13)sX′(φ)= µ
(
ρX(φ)
)= µ( ∨
φψi
bi
)
=
∑
φψi
mi .
This corresponds to the usual definition of belief functions on discrete frames in the
Dempster–Shafer theory of evidence [25]. So, at least in the case of s.r.v. our support
functions are belief functions.
In the case of a r.v. X we have no more a b.p.a. to express the support function. But
the following theorem shows characteristic properties of a support function dsX associated
with a r.v. X.
Theorem 9. For all random variables X ∈ X , the associated support function sX has the
following properties:
(1) sX(e)= 1.
(2) For any finite set φ1, . . . , φm  φ, m 1
(4.14)dsX(φ)
∑
∅=I⊆{1,...,m}
(−1)|I |+1dsX
(⊗
i∈I
φi
)
.
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Proof. (1) follows immediately from (1) of Theorem 8.
In order to prove (2) we note first that ρX(φi) ρX(φ) for all i = 1, . . . ,m. Hence
ρX(φ1)∨ · · · ∨ ρX(φm) ρX(φ).
From this we obtain
dsX(φ)= µ
(
ρX(φ)
)
 µ
(
ρX(φ1)∨ · · · ∨X (φm)
)
.
By the well-known inclusion-exclusion formula from probability theory the right-hand side
of this inequality equals
µ
(
ρX(φ1)∨ · · · ∨ ρX(φm)
)
=
∑
∅=I⊆{1,...,m}
(−1)|I |+1µ
(∧
i∈I
ρX(φi)
)
=
∑
∅=I⊆{1,...,m}
(−1)|I |+1µ
(
ρX
(⊗
i∈I
φi
))
.
Here we have used (2) of Theorem 8. If we note that µ(ρX(
⊗
i∈I φi)) = dsX(
⊗
i∈I φi)
Eq. (4.14) follows. ✷
A function satisfying (4.14) is called monotone to the order ∞. This, together with (1)
of Theorem 9 is a characterizing property of belief functions, as has been shown in [24,
26]. In fact Shafer showed that any function having these properties is the support function
associated to an allocation of probability. Again Shafer considered only Boolean struc-
tures Φ . So, support functions on information algebras Φ are genuine generalizations of
belief functions. It remains to show that as with Boolean structures Φ any function having
the properties of Theorem 9 with respect to an information algebra Φ is induced by some
allocation of probability on Φ , hence some random variable in Φ .
4.5. Normalization
So far we have neglected an important issue: A r.v. X may have the value z for some
assumptions ω, X(ω)= z. Assumptions, which map to z are however to be considered as
inconsistent with the information expressed by the variable X. Let
IX =
{
ω ∈Ω : X(ω)= z}
be the set of inconsistent assumption, scenarios or interpretations (see Section 2). These
scenarios have to be eliminated and the probability has to be conditioned on the consistent
assumptions CX = Ω \ IX . To an arbitrary r.v. X we associate therefore its normalized
version X↓ defined as the restriction of X to CX . But at the same time the original proba-
bility space (Ω,A,P ) is replaced by the new probability space (CX,A ∩CX,PX), where
A∩CX is the σ -algebra of sets A∩CX , for A ∈A and PX is defined as
PX(A∩CX)= P
∗(A∩CX)
P ∗(CX)
,
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where P ∗ is the outer probability measure [20]. We suppose here that P ∗(CX) > 0. Note
that for simple random variables CX is measurable, so that the outer probability equals the
probability.
A r.v. with X(ω) = z for all ω is called normalized. Now, even if we start with nor-
malized r.v.s X1 and X2, their combination may be no more normalized. The combination
can introduce inconsistencies, which have to be eliminated. Therefore, we define a new
operation of combination,
X1 ⊕X2 = (X1 ⊗X2)↓.
This is called normalized combination. We may consider the set H↓ of normalized r.v.s on
a probability space (Ω,A,P ) and verify that this set forms an information algebra [13].
We turn now to allocations of probabilities. For a normalized r.v. X we have ρX(z)=⊥.
An a.o.p. satisfying this condition is called a normalized allocation. We may normalize an
arbitrary a.o.p. ρ by
ρ↓(φ)= ρ(φ)∧ ρc(φ),
where c denotes complementation in B. ρ↓ is to be considered as a mapping from Φ into
the probability algebra (B∧ρc(z),µ′), where B∧ρc(z) is the Boolean algebra of elements
b ∧ ρc(z), for all b ∈ B and µ′ is the measure defined by
µ′
(
b ∧ ρc(z))= µ(b ∧ ρc(z))
µ(ρc(z))
.
As for r.v.s we may define the corresponding normalized combination for normalized
a.o.p.s
ρ1 ⊕ ρ2 = (ρ1 ⊗ ρ2)↓.
The set of normalized a.o.p.s R↓ forms then under this normalized combination again an
information algebra [13].
For normalized r.v.s X (or a.o.p.s) the corresponding support function dsX satisfies the
condition
dsX(z)= 0.
Such support functions are called normalized.
Normalized combination for independent simple random variables corresponds to
Dempster’s rule [7,25]. Two simple probabilistic structures{
ψ11 . . . ψ1r
A11 . . . A1r
}
,
{
ψ21 . . . ψ2s
A21 . . . A2s
}
are called orthogonal, if A1i ∩A2j = ∅, and
P(A1i ∩A2j )= P(A1i ) · P(A2j )
for all i = 1, . . . , s and j = 1, . . . , r . Two simple random variables X1 and X2 are called
independent, if they are associated to two orthogonal simple probability structures. We
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have thendsX1⊕X2(φ)=
∑
φψk
mk,
where ψk =ψ1i ⊗ψ2j = z for some i, j ,
m0 =
∑
i,j : ψ1i⊗ψ2j=z
m1i ·m2j
and
mk = 1
m0
∑
i,j : ψ1i⊗ψ2j=ψk
m1i ·m2j .
This is Dempster’s rule extended to information algebras. It may also be generalized to
general independent r.v.s.
5. Conclusion
In this paper information systems are proposed as general abstract structures to formu-
late information and to deduce consequences of information. This covers many formalisms
for describing information, especially many kind of logics. But it covers as well numeri-
cal systems like linear equations, linear inequalities or more general algebraic systems.
We have shown that introducing assumptions into information systems permits to specify
uncertain information. Again this covers many well-known systems such as assumption-
based propositional logic as used in ATMS (Assumption-based Truth Maintenance Sys-
tems) [6,9]. But also numerical systems with disturbances or measurement errors, as
considered, for example, in statistics [19].
It turns out that information systems induce an interesting algebraic structure which we
call an information algebra. This algebra describes the operation of combination or ag-
gregation of pieces of information. It induces also a partial order of information, that is, a
qualitative measure of information content. Information algebras as defined in this paper
are semilattices. But we want to stress, that for simplicity’s sake we neglected one impor-
tant issue here: Information refers to specified questions. These questions are connected in
some network or lattice. And information must be not only combined in this network, but
also focused on the questions of particular interest. Here we took only information with
respect to one single question into considerations. If a network of questions is modeled,
then a more interesting algebraic structure arises [13].
Information systems represent the logic-part of argumentation. Most important is that
assumption-based information systems or the related information algebras prove to be very
natural structures to introduce probability. This is done by defining random variables with
values in information algebras. This requires some thought, since information algebras are
not Boolean structures. But it is remarkable that random variables in information algebras
form themselves information algebras and that the theory of information algebras permits
in a bootstrap procedure to define general random variables with values in information
algebras.
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This gives us a very satisfactory theory. If we turn to the distribution function of these
random variables we find out, that they are monotone of order ∞. This replaces additivity
of probability measures, which makes no sense in information algebras, because they are
not Boolean. This property qualifies distribution function, which here are called support
functions, as a genuine generalization of belief functions in the sense of Dempster–Shafer
(DS) theory of evidence. Thus this theory finds here again a clear foundation in probability
theory. Further, since Boolean algebras are information algebras too, DS-theory, as pre-
sented here, proves to be a genuine extension of classical probability theory. This is then
the probabilistic part of argumentation.
To conclude let us stress that many open problems remains in this promising theory.
A very important issue in view of applications is the question of the independence and
conditional independence between random variables in information algebras. This in turn
is related to structures which allow for so-called “local computation schemes” which are
well-known for Bayesian networks, but which can be generalized to much more general
systems as has been shown in [27] (see also [13,15]).
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